Epistemic uncertainty on the other hand, arises from a lack of . one way of modelling the relationship between code output and the real-life process, . Representing model inadequacy by uncertainty in closure There is no clear “ best” θ or Mi that will outperform its competitors in M for every sce-. trivia quiz performed under fMRI in which answer uncertainty was . Berlyne5,12, the model distinguishes two components of curiosity . While the relationship between curiosity and surprise as well as the need for closure: An initial test of the wanting-liking model of information-seeking. Opponent. We discuss the relationship between product update and update frames in . just the standard way of modelling uncertainty in a possible worlds setting: .. frame # can be obtained by starting from some set and closing it off under epistemic questions: how much do I know about my opponent's behavior.
Such abstract models of interdependent decisions are capable of representing a whole array of social situations, from strictly competitive to cooperative ones. See Ross for more details about classical game theory and key references. The central analytic tool of classical game theory are solution concepts.
This can be given both a prescriptive or a predictive reading. Nash equilibrium is one of the most well-known solution concepts, but we will encounter others below.
From a prescriptive point of view, a solution concept is a set of practical recommendations—i. From a predictive point of view, solution concepts describe what the players will actually do in certain interactive situation. Consider again the pure strategy Nash equilibria in the above example. Under a prescriptive interpretation, it singles out what players should do in the game. Under the predictive interpretation, these profiles are the ones that one would expect to observe in a actual play of that game.
This solution-concept-driven perspective on games faces many foundational difficulties, which we do not survey here. The details of the frameworks are different, but they do share a common perspective. In this Section, we discuss two key features of this common perspective. This point of view is nicely explained by Robert Stalnaker: There is no special concept of rationality for decision making in a situation where the outcomes depend on the actions of more than one agent.
The acts of other agents are, like chance events, natural disasters and acts of God, just facts about an uncertain world that agents have beliefs and degrees of belief about. The utilities of other agents are relevant to an agent only as information that, together with beliefs about the rationality of those agents, helps to predict their actions. In decision theory, the decision-making units are individuals with preferences over the possible consequences of their actions.
A decision-theoretic choice rule can be used to make recommendations to the decision maker about what she should choose or to predict what the decision-maker will choose. A standard example of a choice rule is maximization of subjective expected utility, underlying the Bayesian view of rationality. From an epistemic point of view, the classical ingredients of a game players, actions, outcomes, and preferences are thus not enough to formulate recommendations or predictions about how the players should or will choose.
One needs to specify the interactive decision problem the players are in, i. There are various types of information that a player has access to in a game situation. For instance, a player may have imperfect information about the play of the game which moves have been played?
Again we turn to Stalnaker to summarize this point of view: John Harsanyi, for instance, argued that all uncertainty about the structure of the game, that is all possible incompleteness in information, can be reduced to uncertainty about the payoffs Harsanyi — This was later formalized and proved by Stuart and Hu Contemporary epistemic game theory takes the view that, although it may ultimately be reducible to strategic uncertainty, making higher-order uncertainty explicit can clarify a great deal of what interactive or strategic rationality means.
Once the context of the game is specified, the rational outcomes are derived, given assumptions about how the players are making their choices and what they know and believe about how the others are choosing. In the remainder of this section, we briefly discuss some general issues that arise from taking an epistemic perspective on games.
We postpone discussion of higher-order and strategic uncertainty until Sections 3, 4 and 5. At one extreme is the ex ante stage where no decision has been made yet. The other extreme is the ex post stage where the choices of all players are openly disclosed. In between these two extremes is the ex interim stage where the players have made their decisions, but they are still uninformed about the decisions and intentions of the other players.
These distinctions are not intended to be sharp. Rather, they describe various stages of information disclosure during the decision-making process. At the ex-post stage the game is basically over: This does not mean that all uncertainty is removed as an agent may remain uncertain about what exactly the others were expecting of her. Common to these stages is the fact that the agents have made a decision, although not necessarily an irrevocable one.
In this entry, we focus on the ex interim stage of decision making. Note that this question is different from the one of how agents should revise their beliefs upon learning that others did not choose rationally. This second question is very relevant in games in which players choose sequentially, and will be addressed in Section 4. Using these ideas, an extensive literature has developed that analyzes games in which players are uncertain about some aspect of the game.
One can naturally wonder about the precise relationship between this literature and the literature we survey in this entry on the epistemic foundations of game theory.
There are two crucial differences between the literature on Bayesian games and the literature we discuss in this entry cf. In a Bayesian game, players are uncertain about the payoffs of the game, what other players believe are the correct payoffs, what other players believe that the other players believe about the payoffs, and so on, and this is the only source of uncertainty.
In particular, if a player comes to know the payoffs of the other players, then that player is certain and correct about the possible rational choices of the other players. That is, all players choose a strategy that maximizes their expected utility given their beliefs about the game, beliefs about what other players believe about the game, and so on. Rather, they are better described as conventions followed by Harsanyi and subsequent researchers studying Bayesian games. Games with imperfect information can be pictured as follows: In this section, we briefly discuss a foundational issue that arises in games with imperfect information.
Kuhn introduced the distinction between perfect and imperfect recall in games with imperfect information. They feel disdain towards other creeds, religions, and cultures Indeed, according to Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, and De Gradaa need for closure can explain many prejudices. Specifically, when people experience a need for closure, they seek clarity and certainty immediately. They want to know which behaviors they are expected to enact.
Consequently, individuals gravitate to groups in which the norms and standards are unambiguous. Many of the hallmarks or manifestations of a need for closure seem to reflect this proclivity towards unambiguous norms and stable groups.
For example, when need for closure is elevated, individuals prefer autocratic leaders, reject practices that deviate from group norms, resist change, and adopt conservative values. All these behaviors reinforce the group and, therefore, clarify the norms that individuals are supposed to follow. That is, when need for closure is elevated, individuals seek a sense of clarity-an understanding of how they should behave. Because they eschew careful contemplation, they seek someone to impose this understanding and clarity.
Autocratic leaders often fulfill this role. Because they prefer clarity and certainty, they would like society to follow rules and conventions. As a consequence, they tend to comply with all regulations and traditions themselves.
In other words, they tend to adopt traditional, conservative beliefs - such as "People should be treated with respect" and "Rules should not be broken. If individuals identify with a hostile collective, such as an extremist political party, this relationship between need for closure and preference for competition is especially pronounced. In short, when individuals report a need for closure, their prevailing orientations are most likely to dictate their behavior, especially during stressful contexts.
This rigidity is especially pronounced if these individuals perceive their opponent to be experienced in business and competitive in nature. That is, because need for closure curbs careful analysis, these individuals do not consider their opponent carefully.
Instead, they tend to apply stereotypes to judge other individuals. If someone else seems experienced in business, they will apply the stereotype that commercial employees tend to be competitive. Need for closure can also compromise the capacity of individuals to adapt effectively when they move to another country, particularly if they arrive or live with someone from their own nation.
That is, these individuals, because they do not think as carefully, adopt the same perspective as anyone in their immediate environment. If they live with someone from their own culture, they will tend to adopt the same values and perspectives of this person, and hence will not embrace the attitudes and rituals of their host country Kosic, A.
Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Attitudes to art A need for closure is related to preferences towards art. In particular, a need for closure, characterized by a preference in people to perceive their surroundings as predictable and unambiguous, corresponds to an aversion to plays with ambiguous endings and abstract paintings.
This possibility was substantiated by Wiersema, van der Schalk, and van Kleef In one study, participants rated the degree to which they like a series of paintings, only half of which were abstract. Half the participants were also told to evaluate each painting within 3 seconds, and this time pressure was shown to increase need for closure.
A time limit was not imposed on the other participants. Time pressure, and thus need for closure, decreased the extent to which participants liked the abstract art.
Another study showed that need for closure is negatively associated with the degree to which people like plays with ambiguous endings.
Fundamental attribution error Several studies have examined whether need for closure amplifies or inhibits the fundamental attribution error.
When someone commits an error at work, colleagues might assume the person is incompetent, overlooking other factors such as defects in their equipment or mistakes in the instructions. The relationship between need for closure and this fundamental attribution error has generated considerable controversy. Webster pioneered this exploration, showing that need for closure is indeed positively associated with the fundamental attribution error. In this study, a person read an essay, presented over video.
This person, apparently, had been instructed to espouse the opinion they championed--an opinion that contradicted the attitudes of most participants. Participants were then instructed to express their impressions of this person. Participants tended to rate this person as undesirable, overlooking the constraints that were imposed on this individual, especially if they reported an elevated need for closure. In other words, if individuals like to form opinions rapidly and maintain these attitudes, they tend to ascribe behavior to dispositions of the person rather than features of the context.
Nevertheless, several limitations might compromise the validity of this study. The instruction to form "impressions" of the reader, according to Steldermight have oriented attention towards the person instead of the situation. Second, the study did not entail a condition in which a person presented an essay that aligned with the opinions of participants.
Hence, whether the essay or some other factor governed the ratings cannot be established. Indeed, a few subsequent studies failed to replicate this finding e. Stalder conducted a study that resolved these inconsistencies. In particular, Stalder argued that one facet of need for closure, need for structure, which comprises discomfort with ambiguity, preference for order, and preference for predictability, is positively related to the fundamental attribution error. In contrast, another facet, decisiveness, is negatively related to this error.
Specifically, in this study, the question-contestant paradigm e. Participants observe two individuals. One individual constructs, and then asks, questions that assess general knowledge. The other individual, the contestant, attempts to answer these questions. This person, however, can answer only 3 of the 10 questions correctly. Typically, participants assume the person who constructed the questions must be more knowledgeable, disregarding the unfair advantage that is afforded to this person.
Need for closure
In this study, individuals who reported a high, rather than low, need for structure were more inclined to perceive the contestant as less knowledgeable than was the person who constructed and asked the questions. Individuals who reported high, rather than low, decisiveness were, in contrast, more inclined to perceive the contestant as knowledgeable Stalder, According to Stalderneed for structure increases the inclination of participants to accept the conclusions they have formed rather than challenge their assumptions, called freezing.
Individuals who exhibit need for structure, therefore, will rapidly ascribe the deficient performance to the limited knowledge of this contestant--and then fail to consider alternative perspectives. In contrast, decisive individuals form very rapid conclusions or judgments, called seizing. In contrast, indecisive individuals ruminate over the information extensively. As they ruminate, they become more inclined to consider extraneous information.
This extraneous information might actually divert their attention from the actual state of affairs--the advantage that was afforded to the person who constructed the questions.
Indecisive individuals might, therefore, become more inclined to exhibit the fundamental attribution error. Response to anger When individuals experience an elevated need for closure, sometimes called an epistemic motivation, they may be more sensitive to the anger of other people. Specifically, according to emotions as social information model e.
To illustrate, if one person seems angry, the other individuals infer their progress is inadequate, enhancing persistence and ultimately progress.
However, if individuals do not experience a need for closure, they are not as motivated to derive inferences from the emotional expression of other people. The anger of one person, thus, does not enhance persistence or progress in the other person. Consistent with this account, Van Kleef, Anastasopoulou, and Nijstad showed that need for closure does indeed moderate the association between the anger of one person and the subsequent creativity of another person.
In this study, participants first completed a measure of personal need for structure, sometimes regarded as a subset of need for closure. Then, participants completed a task that demands creativity.
Next, they received feedback from another person about their performance. This person either seemed angry or unemotional when they communicated this feedback. Finally, they completed another creative task--to identify as many uses of a brick as possible. If participants reported a high need for closure, angry feedback, compared to unemotional feedback, was more likely to promote original answers to the task of identifying uses of bricks.
They also persisted on this task and seemed more engaged. Accordingly, in contexts that promote a need for closure, such as time pressure or noise, anger or dissatisfaction from managers can enhance persistence in employees. Nevertheless, managers should not direct this anger or dissatisfaction to employees directly but just imply the situation is unsatisfactory. Social networks Individuals who report a need for closure often assume that two people who both know someone else must also know each other, called transitivity.
Furthermore, if individuals report a need for closure, they assume that two people of the same ethnicity or race are more likely to know each other than two people of different ethnicities or races.
This pattern of observations was confirmed by Flynn, Reagans, and Guillory In one study, participants were students, enrolled in the same class. They were first asked to list the colleagues to whom they would approach to seek assistance.
They were also asked to list the colleagues who seek help from them. Next, they were asked to specify which colleagues would approach other classmates to seek this assistance. Finally, they completed a measure of need for closure. If participants reported an elevated need for closure, they often committed errors on this task. In particular, they often assumed that two people who both help or seek help from the same person also must help or seek help from each other.
In other words, they presupposed, often incorrectly, that colleagues who have formed a strong relationship with the same classmate must have formed a strong relationship with each other.
Thus, when individuals experience a need for closure, they prefer transitivity, in which they assume that two people who both know someone else must also know each other.
Presumably, when transitivity operates, knowledge tends to be more evenly distributed across the network. Hence, the knowledge of each person can be more readily predicted, satisfying the need for closure and clarity. In the second study, participants were exposed to a series of photographs of various people.
Eight of these people were European American students, four of these people were African American students, and four of these people were Asian American students. Next, participants were told that 30 relationships had been formed amongst these 16 students. They were asked to guess which students knew each other.
Need for closure / smoss2 - Sicotests
When individuals experience a need for closure, they become more inclined to categorize people into groups. These categorizations ensure they feel they can predict the behavior of people. Indeed, favoritism towards people within their group--and derogation of people outside their group--become more pronounced. Hence, different ethnicities or races become more salient.
Determinants of need for closure Previous research has uncovered several contextual factors that mitigate this need for closure. Time pressure, for example, increases the cost of reflection and analysis e. That is, when individuals feel they must complete a task, or form a judgment, within a limited duration, they recognize they must reach a decision before the deadline has elapsed.
In addition to time pressure, events that underscore the mortality of individuals could also augment the costs that accrue from deliberation and analysis. Graphic depictions of fatal accidents and similar images, for example, highlight this mortality.
To alleviate this affective experience, they strive to integrate themselves with an enduring entity, such as a broader social collective, to cultivate a form of immortality. First, they attempt to perceive this social collective as uniform and predictable in which all members share the same values and principles. Careful deliberation of issues could uncover discrepancies between their own attitudes and the opinions of this broader society.
Both noise and inebriation retard or hinder analytic processes, detracting from the benefits of deliberation and consideration.
As these benefits decline, individuals become more likely to eschew careful analysis, and the need for closure thus escalates. Exposure to fictional stories After people read a series of fictional short stories, rather than nonfictional essays, their need for closure tends to subside, especially if they tend to read widely.
While people read fiction, they contemplate a variety of events, but without the urgency to reach decisions, inhibiting neural circuits that underpin a need for closure. In addition, while they read, they are also inclined to adopt the thinking styles of the protagonists--thinking styles that differ from their own tendencies. Accordingly, individuals become willing to entertain a diversity of thoughts rather than invoke entrenched tendencies, also manifesting as a decrease in need for closure.
These possibilities were proposed and validated by Djikic, Oatley, and Moldoveanu In their study, participants first completed the author recognition test, in which they needed to indicate which writers, from a list names, 40 of which are foils, they recognize.
Next, they read either a short story or nonfictional essay, before rating the level of interest and artistry of this work. Finally, they completed a series of questionnaires, including a measure of need for closure. Compared to participants who read a nonfictional essay, participants who read a fictional short story reported diminished levels of need for closure, especially a reduced need for order and discomfort with ambiguity.
This effect was most pronounced in participants who recognized either fictional or nonfictional writers. Dimensions of need for closure In particular, as posited by Webster and Kruglanskiindividuals who experience a need for closure demonstrate five distinct, but related, tendencies.
First, they exhibit discomfort with ambiguity and they feel uneasy when uncertain about some event or issue-an emotion that dissipates once they receive clarity. Second, to ensure clarity, they demonstrate a preference for predictability and prefer settings in which they can anticipate the events that are likely to unfold.
Third, because of this preference, they report a preference for order and seek environments that are organized and ordered, governed by consistent rules, policies, and practices. Fourth, because of their aversion to ambiguity, they reach decisions rapidly, without deliberation or delay, referred to as decisiveness.
Finally, to fulfill this goal, they seldom consider other sources of information, such as the advice of experts, before they reach these decisions, designated as close mindedness.
Some researchers, however, exclude decisiveness, because this subscale does not correlate positively with the other dimensions e. According to other researchers e. The first dimension, need for structure, comprises three factors: Need for structure mainly relates to the freezing process--the inclination of individuals to accept the judgments they form rather than evaluate alternatives.
When this conceptualization is applied, close mindedness tends to be excluded ow correlations with other facets e. The second dimension relates to only one of the factors that underpins need for closure: Decisiveness mainly relates to the seizing process--the inclination of individuals to form rapid decisions or judgments. Implications of need for closure Attention residue The discovery that time pressure increase the need to reach cognitive closure has advanced the research into attention residue.
Specifically, at work, individuals tend to undertake a series of tasks. They might first need to perform some accounting task and then evaluate a series of job applicants, for example.
Unfortunately, when individuals proceed to the second activity, such as the evaluation of job applicants, some of their attention and thoughts still revolve around the first task--called attention residue. Attention residue might include ruminations about the previous activity, which are critical, repetitive thoughts that individuals entertain about themselves, evoked by failure or other problems Nolen-Hoeksema, Attention residue, however, also comprises a broader array of reflections, such as alternative solutions Leroy, Leroy uncovered two factors that diminish this attention residue.
First, and most obviously, when individuals feel they have completed some task--that is, when they feel their goals or targets have been fulfilled--they are less distracted on subsequent tasks.
The level of attention residue declines. Specifically, incomplete goals tend to remain salient or activated Klinger, As a consequence, even when individuals shift to another activity, in a different environment, the goals that are related to the previous task might remain salient. To substantiate this possibility, Leroy conducted a pair of studies in which participants undertook two consecutive tasks: Some of the participants were assigned very steep targets on the verbal activity.
These participants did not usually fulfill these targets when they proceeded to the next activity. Other participants were assigned modest targets on the verbal activity and thus satisfied these goals. Compared to participants who had fulfilled their targets, participants who had not fulfilled their targets were more likely to entertain thoughts about the verbal activity while completing the subsequent task. That is, immediately after completing the verbal activity, they recognized words associated with this task, such as solve or finish, more rapidly than did other participants on a lexical decision task Leroy, That is, they could rapidly ascertain whether or not these items were indeed legitimate words--a procedure that is often used to evaluate the accessibility of some concept e.
Furthermore, if participants had fulfilled their targets, their performance on a subsequent activity was more proficient. They could remember the contents of each resume more effectively. Nevertheless, as Leroy emphasized, even after individuals complete some activity, and feel like they have fulfilled some goal, they still occasionally contemplate this task. Leroy applied some of the insights of cognitive closure to uncover another factor that might curb attention residue.
Specifically, Leroy recognized that time pressure tends to promote a need to reach cognitive closure, which could thus temper attention residue. That is, when participants experience a sense of time pressure or haste, they consider only the primary alternatives rather than deliberate over every possible course of action.
Because they confine their attention to a limited array of alternatives, they are less inclined to experience a sense of regret Iyengar, --that is, they do not feel as attached to the courses of action they rejected.
To examine this proposition, Leroy manipulated the level of time pressure that individuals experienced. Some participants were informed that most individuals feel the target is difficult to reach in the allotted time--to evoke a sense of time pressure. Other participants were informed the target is manageable. Time pressure did indeed curb attention residue. Participants were less inclined to reflect upon the previous activity, as gauged by a lexical decision task. They also felt more confident about their performance on this activity.
Social tuning According to Bechtoldt, De Dreu, Nijstad, and Choisome individuals experience a strong motivation to seek understanding, called epistemic motivation, epitomized by a need for closure.
Individuals can derive this information and knowledge from many sources. If these individuals are communal and agreeable, they will be more sensitive to information that enhances the harmony and progress of their friendships or collectives. They will, therefore, become particularly aware of the norms and standards of these groups. According to this hypothesis, if individuals experience a strong epistemic motivation--if they strive to uncover information to improve their understanding and overcome confusion--they seek opinions and knowledge from their social environment.
This tendency is especially pronounced in people with more communal, affiliative motives. To illustrate, in many Western nations, original and unique ideas are valued, because individualism is cherished. Need for closure, coupled with a communal or agreeable demeanor, increases the likelihood that individuals conform to these norms and thus generate more original, novel, appropriate, and creative solutions.
In contrast, in many Eastern nations, individuals are more inclined to conform than to uncover unique solutions or perspectives. In this instance, need for closure, together with a communal or agreeable demeanor, also increases the probability that individuals conform to these norms and thus generate fewer original, novel, appropriate, and creative solutions.
Bechtoldt, De Dreu, Nijstad, and Choi undertook a series of studies to confirm this account. Dutch participants, in which the culture generally values originality rather than conformity, were engaged in a brainstorming task to identify better ideas about how to improve teaching. Time pressure was manipulated to increase or decrease epistemic motivation.
Agreeableness was also measured. Consistent with the hypotheses, time pressure, or epistemic motivation, was positively associated with the extent to which members of these groups expressed disagreement, discussed alternatives, challenged the solutions that other people offered. Consequently, time pressure increased the likelihood that participants offered original ideas. However, these benefits of epistemic motivation was observed in agreeable participants only.
Bechtoldt, De Dreu, Nijstad, and Choi undertook some additional studies that were similar, apart from a few amendments. For example, in one study, rather than assess agreeableness, participants were granted rewards that depended on individual or group performance, to prime an egocentric or communal orientation respectively.
In addition, to prime an epistemic motivation, some participants were asked to comment on the strategies they utilized.