Lisa curtis china military and security relationship with pakistan

In response to Pakistan's overtures, China called on strong security ties with Pakistan, there are few planes (Curtis and Cheng Curtis, The most significant development in China–Pakistan military . in the Indian Ocean (Curtis Curtis, Lisa. Aug 28, Pakistan looks to China as it turns away from Washington secretary of state, and Lisa Curtis, who serves on the National Security Council, were very clearly the military strategy in Afghanistan has not worked and it will not work. For Beijing, the relationship offers a faster route to the sea for goods from. Jul 12, The strategic alliance between China, Pakistan is primarily driven by of the US China Economic and Security Review Commission, said during a Lisa Curtis of the Heritage Foundation - a top American think-tank - said China, she argued, seeks to build strategic and military ties with Pakistan in order.

It cannot be treated, for example, in the same way the U.

lisa curtis china military and security relationship with pakistan

As a first step, the U. Unless Pakistan takes immediate steps to demonstrate that it fully shares U. At the same time, maintain the option for Pakistan to be an ally of the United States in the future. Were Pakistan to cease its current tolerance of and support to terrorist groups, one can envisage grounds for common interest and policies on a range of issues that would form the basis of mutual interest.

This could involve a package of trade and investment cooperation that would be mutually win-win for the economies of the United States and Pakistan. Rolling back the tide of extremism in Pakistan will be an enormous task and could take a generation, but once again there are some recent hopeful signs that the Pakistani civilian government under Prime Minister Sharif is trying to move the country in this direction.

In March the Sharif government followed through with the execution of the assassin of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer, who was killed in because of his support for religious minorities and efforts to roll back controversial blasphemy laws. Prime Minister Sharif also recently re-named its National Center for Physics after a Nobel Prize-winning Pakistani physicist, Abdus Salam, a member of a minority sect of Islam that is considered heretic by hardline Islamists.

These important first steps toward signaling a more moderate and tolerant course for Pakistani society must be recognized and encouraged by the international community. It is important, however, to monitor the overall trend and direction of Pakistani policy, given the track record of policy reversals.

Humanitarian and social aid should not be impacted by the counterterrorism issue since it is the military that controls policies toward terrorist groups. Work through diplomacy with other countries, especially China and Gulf Arab states that share U. In particular, Washington must seek to work more closely with China, which shares concerns about the presence of terrorist groups in the region and the threat they pose to the proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor CPEC.

Gulf Arab countries, too, must be encouraged to press Pakistan to change its direction. Both history and recent events demonstrate that the Pakistan Government is deeply aware of and anxious about its international image. Threatening to damage that image in subtle or obvious ways will garner attention in Islamabad and Rawalpindi.

Enforce counterterrorism conditions on U. Even though counterterrorism conditions on military aid have been in place for the last seven years, the Obama administration for several years used its national security waiver authority to bypass the legislative conditions.

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However, Congress over the last two years has included in the National Defense Authorization Act language that prohibits a portion of military reimbursement payments for Pakistan from falling under waiver authority.

In addition Congress blocked U. Government funding for the transfer of additional F aircraft to Islamabad for the same reason. It no longer makes sense to waive the counterterrorism conditions on U. While a grace period may have been merited for Pakistan seven years ago, it would be foolish to keep giving the Pakistanis a pass when it comes to taking action against terrorist groups that are directly undermining U.

Keep the option of using unilateral action including drones to target Taliban targets in Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban safe havens in Quetta and elsewhere should no longer be safe. This does not require a campaign on the scale of that against al-Qaida frombut it should be more than the one-off attack against Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in Lay out a sequence and timeline for specific actions Pakistan must take with regard to terrorists responsible for attacks outside Pakistan and link these steps to future U.

An important benchmark should be for Pakistan to arrest and keep in jail known terrorist leaders. In AprilPakistan released from jail the ringleader of the Mumbai attacks, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, a decision it should be asked to reverse. Other steps should involve closing down terror training camps and disrupting financing of terror activities.

Militant infiltration into Indian-controlled territory dropped considerably when former President Pervez Musharraf was in power, especially fromdemonstrating Pakistan has the ability to turn off the taps when it chooses to do so.

China, Pakistan ties driven by rivalry with India: US experts - The Economic Times

In addition, Pakistan must invalidate all Pakistani ID cards, passports, and special passes for the Taliban to prevent them from easily passing through military checkpoints. Lastly, Islamabad must seize the financial assets and real estate holdings of all Afghan Taliban and Pakistani terrorist groups that support them. If Pakistan does not make progress on the above steps, the U. Pursue Taliban reconciliation talks on a track separate from U.

Washington should remain open to attempts to restart Taliban talks with the Afghan government, but should not plan its strategy around this long-shot scenario. It is likely the Taliban will try to convince the international community that they are willing to negotiate, in order to influence decision-making on troop levels in Afghanistan by the new Trump administration.

There should be consequences for Pakistan if it blocks realistic efforts to begin peace talks. Seek to avoid a complete breakdown in U. Yet it also is not in the U. While Pakistan frequently does not behave like an ally, it does selectively cooperate with the U. Conclusion After 15 years of the U. We have seen the limits of relying mainly on inducements to encourage greater cooperation.

Moving forward, the U. The wavering level of commitment to Afghanistan by previous administrations, together with timelines for withdrawal based largely on U. With India-Pakistan tensions also on the rise, the Trump administration must formulate a new policy approach toward Pakistan quickly.

Both Indian and Pakistani officials have ratcheted up their rhetoric toward the other in recent weeks, and neither shows much interest in reviving dialogue. Another major terrorist attack in India conducted by Pakistan-based militants could precipitate a wider conflict that has the potential of going nuclear. After years of restraint in the face of Pakistani terrorist provocations, the Modi government has laid down a new marker that it will not stand by in the face of such attacks.

It would be helpful for Trump administration officials to examine the U. In both cases, the U. In this way, the U. Fortunately, these nations share the U.

For too long, the U. Pakistan has long insisted that it is unable to meet U. Pakistani officials have privately argued that local terrorist groups such as Jaish-e-Muhammad or Lashkar-e-Taiba are too powerful and pervasive for the military establishment to challenge now. At the same time, the U. This is indeed a tall order that may in the end fail. Individuals have signed on to this report in their individual capacities. The China-Pakistan partnership serves both Chinese and Pakistani interests by presenting India with a potential two-front theatre in the event of war with either country.

During the Indo—Pakistani War, China took a less threatening posture toward India, possibly because of Soviet warnings to the Chinese. The most significant development in China—Pakistan military cooperation occurred inwhen China supplied Pakistan with 34 short-range ballistic M missiles.

Beijing also built a turnkey ballistic missile manufacturing facility near Rawalpindi and helped Pakistan develop the km—range solid-fuelled Shaheen-1 ballistic missile.

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China argued that the proposed sale should be viewed as part of the earlier agreement struck with Pakistan before Beijing joined the NSG. An Obama Administration decision to allow the China—Pakistan nuclear deal to advance unhindered would contradict earlier statements by U.

lisa curtis china military and security relationship with pakistan

Indian analysts also noted the presence of PLA logistics and engineering corps in the region to provide flood relief and to build infrastructure projects such as roads, railways, and dams. The troops are most likely construction battalions helping to build transportation links between Pakistan and China, possibly from Gwadar Port.

Nonetheless, New Delhi would view with consternation the possibility of Chinese troops stationed on both the eastern and northwestern borders of Indian Kashmir. Beijing has sold modern missile boats to Bangladesh and provided extensive military aid to Sri Lanka to help it win the war against the Tamil Tigers in Beijing increased its involvement with Nepal after the March ethnic Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule on the eve of the summer Olympics in Beijing.

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Beijing has been pressing Nepal to tighten its borders with Tibet, which has led to a major decrease in the number of Tibetans able to flee to Nepal in recent years.

China is also bolstering trade with Nepal and pursuing road-building and hydropower projects. India has also enhanced its naval profile in Southeast Asia, holding periodic joint exercises with Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Also with an eye on China, India has prioritised strengthening relations with Japan through increasing military contacts, maritime cooperation, and trade and investment ties. Contesting the Seas… Indo—Chinese strategic competition increasingly revolves around naval issues.

India views with concern the Chinese military presence in and around the Indian Ocean and is carefully considering what it means for energy and sea-lane security. India is steadily increasing its defence budgets and focusing particular attention on building up its naval capabilities. In February, New Delhi unveiled its budget with an 11 percent increase for defence.

It already has one aircraft carrier and is striving to put into place three carriers by as part of its naval expansion and desire to project power throughout the Indian Ocean. India has also carefully cultivated ties with the countries of the Indian Ocean rim, including Mauritius, Maldives, Seychelles, and Madagascar, providing these countries with naval support, such as offshore naval patrol vessels and staff and training.

In FebruaryIndia convened the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, inviting participants from the littoral states to discuss maritime security. The United Arab Emirates hosted the second conference in May India is pursuing better ties with Vietnam to try to check Chinese naval influence and access to the Indian Ocean. New Delhi initiated a new security partnership with Hanoi in that emphasized defence training, supply of advanced weaponry, and the potential for India to gain access to the South China Sea through the Cam Ranh Bay naval and air base.

Indian officials have long understood the importance of Vietnam in the South China Sea and its potential to balance the Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. China, meanwhile, increasingly sees India as a maritime as well as a land threat. In the Chinese view, this shift began in the wake of the Indo-Pakistani War, with increased construction of naval bases and forces and a concomitant expansion of Indian strategic guiding thoughts zhanlue zhidao sixiang to the Indian Ocean, and accelerated in the s with the dispatch of Indian troops to Sri Lanka and the Maldives.

While some of this naval effort is seen as being aimed at other states in the Indian Ocean region, especially Pakistan, the Chinese assessment also sees the Indian naval buildup as aimed at extra-regional military powers.

The Chinese assessment is that the Indian military has expanded its area of operations westward to the Persian Gulf and eastward to the Straits of Malacca, encompassing the key sea lanes of communications SLOCs that Chinese oil imports must transit. As China modernizes its navy, there is some potential for the PLA to establish a greater presence in the Indian Ocean.

New Delhi has an advanced civilian space program and launches satellites for other countries, including Israel. While not a decisive factor in determining the overall power balance between the two Asian giants, this demographic trend will play a role in regional security dynamics.

Adult literacy in China stands at about 91 percent, compared to roughly 61 percent in India. Trade could mitigate other competitive interests Trade and business ties between China and India have increased dramatically in the past decade.

The rapidly expanding trade relationship between the two countries could help encourage a mutual interest in regional stability. While Beijing will almost certainly maintain close strategic ties to Pakistan, its growing economic stakes in India could motivate China to pay more attention to balancing its ties between India and Pakistan.

On the other hand, some Indian analysts believe that China is pursuing a two-pronged strategy of lulling India into complacency with greater economic interaction while taking steps to encircle India and undermine its security.

While Pakistan presents the most immediate threat to India, Indian strategists increasingly view China as the most important long-term security challenge. Long-standing China-Pakistan security ties are a continuing source of angst in New Delhi and reminder of a potential two-front war.

While India seeks to avoid conflict with China, Indian military planners also assess that they need to develop sufficient capabilities to deter an increasingly powerful and assertive China. Some Indian strategists even favour a go-slow approach to the U. The partnership between the U. To this end, the U. In January, the U. During the s, the U. Develop new initiatives for keeping the Indian Ocean safe and secure.

India and the U. However, India has not joined the U. India has been more interested in coordinating with other countries on a bilateral basis to address piracy rather than joining multinational anti-piracy organisations. InIndia initiated the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium to discuss maritime security with the other littoral states but did not include the U. One of the main goals of the forum should be to agree to a code of conduct for naval vessels operating in the region and to develop an action plan for dealing with violations of the agreed code.

US Policy in South Asia by Lisa Curtis

Improvements in these areas would help to reassure India, especially in the event of a growing PLA naval presence. India is clearly the dominant power in South Asia, but China is making new inroads with these countries that could come at the expense of stability and democratic trends in the region.

Increase cooperation with India to address cyber security threats. In Decembermore than computers belonging to top-ranking Indian government officials, including three service chiefs and former National Security Adviser M.